Update on stats 2017-11
Viktor Dukhovni
ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Wed Nov 29 05:42:33 CET 2017
Summary: The number of DANE-enabled domains that have also been sighted
on Google's email transparency report has increased from 122 to 125.
The total domain count has increased from 172120 to 173857.
The number DNSSEC domains in the survey stands at 5015834,
thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 3.4% of domains with DNSSEC.
Many DNSSEC domains use third-party MX hosts, that don't
have DNSSEC, so they can't benefit from DANE until their
providers secure the MX hosts. Please ask your provider
to enable DNSSEC and DANE on their MX hosts.
As of today I count 173857 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA
records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As
expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the handful of
DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in bulk for the
domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by domain count
are:
68513 domeneshop.no
61900 transip.nl
18440 udmedia.de
6396 bhosted.nl
1785 nederhost.net
1284 yourdomainprovider.net
1012 ec-elements.com
507 core-networks.de
391 omc-mail.com
349 mailbox.org
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to the
full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.
There are 2969 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are found,
this counts each of the above providers as just one zone, so is a measure
of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers deployed. There are 3672
distinct MX host certificates matched by the server's TLSA RRset.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 4409. These
cover 4659 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA
records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 125 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 76 are in recent reports:
gmx.at mail.de ouderportaal.nl
travelbirdbelgie.be posteo.de overheid.nl
nic.br ruhr-uni-bochum.de pathe.nl
registro.br tum.de uvt.nl
gmx.ch uni-erlangen.de xs4all.nl
open.ch unitybox.de domeneshop.no
anubisnetworks.com unitymedia.de webcruitermail.no
gmx.com web.de debian.org
isavedialogue.com egmontpublishing.dk freebsd.org
mail.com tilburguniversity.edu gentoo.org
solvinity.com enron.email ietf.org
t-2.com octopuce.fr isc.org
trashmail.com comcast.net lazarus-ide.org
xfinity.com dd24.net netbsd.org
xfinityhomesecurity.com gmx.net openssl.org
xfinitymobile.com hr-manager.net samba.org
nic.cz t-2.net torproject.org
bayern.de xs4all.net asf.com.pt
bund.de asp4all.nl handelsbanken.se
fau.de bhosted.nl minmyndighetspost.se
freenet.de bit.nl skatteverket.se
gmx.de boozyshop.nl t-2.si
jpberlin.de hierinloggen.nl mail.co.uk
lrz.de otvi.nl govtrack.us
Of the ~174000 domains, 780 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to advertise
STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands today at 198.
Below is a list of the 101 underlying MX hosts that serve these domains
and whose TLSA records don't match reality:
Hall of Shame:
white.agoracon.at mx2.spam-sponge.de mail.misbegotten.net
mail.dipietro.id.au mx3.spam-sponge.de oostergo.net
asp-mxtest.belnet.be mx1.spamsponge.de mx2.oostergo.net
eufront.stansoft.bg mx2.spamsponge.de wfbrace.net
eumembers.stansoft.bg mx3.spamsponge.de mx2.wfbrace.net
andbraiz.com mx10.timotoups.de mx2.cbrace.nl
mail.digitalwebpros.com fsck.email mx3.cbrace.nl
mail.dnsmadefree.com smtp.flipmail.es mail.fscker.nl
smtp-1.httrack.com mail.0pc.eu smtp1.lococensus.nl
mail.itsmine.com mail.antoineducret.eu smtp2.lococensus.nl
demo.liveconfig.com mail2.cesidianroot.eu avs.mymailcleaner.nl
mx04.mykolab.com gamepixel.eu mail.myzt.nl
mail.noneuclideanconcepts.com webmail.kassoft.eu nuj-netherlands.nl
lon-do.pieterpottie.com smtp.skolovi.eu mx2.nuj-netherlands.nl
ny-do.pieterpottie.com mail2.subse.eu bounder.steelyard.nl
ma.qbitnet.com smtp.vdlaken.eu mail.abanto-zierbena.org
stmics01.smia-automotive.com mx.quentindavid.fr eumembers.datacentrix.org
romulus.wittsend.com servmail.fr genius.konundrum.org
mail.zx.com mail.demongeot.info mx2.maicolepape.org
mx.bels.cz mail.nonoserver.info smtp2.amadigi.ovh
mail.davidbodnar.cz mx1.email.youwerehere.info smtp3.amadigi.ovh
gaia.nfx.cz mx2.email.youwerehere.info itaskmanager.ovh
petg.cz node1.mxbackup.io mail.bacrau.ro
mail.seslost.cz mail.rapidfuse.io mail.itconnect.ro
mail.zionbit.cz mail.lsd.is mx.itconnect.ro
mail.absynth.de mail.laukas.lt mail.pasion.ro
mail.all4.de mx.datenknoten.me mail.familie-sander.rocks
badf00d.de mx.giesen.me mx1.shevaldin.ru
mail.denniseffing.de rootbox.me halon.gislaved.se
mail.friehm.de mail.adeline.mobi halon02.gislaved.se
mutt.lsexperts.de mail.castleturing.net mail.labbrack.se
www.mtg.de mail.culm.net mail.rostit.se
mail.ocmenzel.de anubis.delphij.net mail.xn----ymcadjpj1at5o.xn--wgbh1c
mx1.spam-sponge.de mail.efflam.net
Some recently notified, but the number of long-term problem MX
hosts has been slowly creeping up... Please make sure to monitor
the validity of your TLSA records, and implement a reliable key
rotation procedure. Let's Encrypt users in particular tend to
forget that by default Let's Encrypt certificate renewal replaces
both the key and certificate, please read:
http://postfix.1071664.n5.nabble.com/WoSign-StartCom-CA-in-the-news-td86436.html#a86444
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/new-certbot-client-and-csr-option/15766
https://www.internetsociety.org/deploy360/blog/2016/03/lets-encrypt-certificates-for-mail-servers-and-dane-part-2-of-2/
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/please-avoid-3-0-1-and-3-0-2-dane-tlsa-records-with-le-certificates/7022
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
When updating the certificate chain you need to temporarily
pre-publish multiple TLSA records matching the current and future
certificate:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes#3
However, with "3 1 1" + "2 1 1", the rollover process can be
substantially simplified:
http://postfix.1071664.n5.nabble.com/WoSign-StartCom-CA-in-the-news-td86436.html#a86444
https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/uta/current/msg01498.html
After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email of any
kind, the number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support
stands at 132. The top 6 (the rest have too few domains to include
in a top 10) name server operators with problem domains
are:
22 firstfind.nl
7 active24.cz
5 tse.jus.br
4 ignum.com
4 glbns.com
4 army.mil
Only 7 of the DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email
transparency reports:
idaho.gov
nsysu.edu.tw
tse.jus.br
rotterdam.nl
tiviths.com.br
trtrj.jus.br
tre-ce.jus.br
The problem DNS queries are:
_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br
_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br
_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br
_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br
_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br
_25._tcp.inbound.idaho.gov
_25._tcp.mail.rotterdam.nl
_25._tcp.barracuda.nsysu.edu.tw
[ See <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08>,
Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a
"feature" of some firewalls, that enables droping of DNS requests
for all but the most common RRtypes. Do not make the mistake
of enabling this firewall "feature". ]
The oldest outstanding DNS issue is an SOA signature issue at
truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.barracuda.truman.edu/VGzORw/dnssec/
I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about
and take the time to resolve the problem.
--
Viktor.
[1] Some domains deliberately include MX hosts that are always
down, presumably as a hurdle to botnet SMTP code that gives up
where real MTAs might persist. I am not a fan of this type of
defence (it can also impose undue latency on legitimate email).
However, provided the dead hosts still have TLSA records, (which
don't need to match anything, just need to exist and be well-formed)
there's no loss of security.
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