Deprecating DNSSEC algorithms 5 (RSASHA1) and 7 (RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1)

Viktor Dukhovni ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Fri Mar 6 17:55:05 CET 2020


On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 05:33:42PM +0100, Peter van Dijk wrote:

> On Thu, 2020-01-09 at 20:19 -0500, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> > If/when you do decide to switch algorithms, please perform the migration
> > with care.  Algorithm rollovers can be tricky.  The basic process is:
> > 
> >     1.  Publish and activate a ZSK for the new algorithm.  Your zone
> >         should now be double-signed, which each record having two
> >         RRSIGs.  Don't forget to bump the SOA.
> 
> Your zone is now bogus.

No it is not.  The zone is signed with two ZSKs, one for each
algorithm.  The idea is sign the zone *at the same time* as
the ZSK is introduced, not add the ZSK and sign later.

> > The reason for all this is to maintain the followin invariants:
> > 
> >     A. Each algorithm mentioned in the parent zone DS RRset must
> >        have a matching KSK in the zone's DNSKEY RRset.
> > 
> >     B. Each KSK algorithm appearing in the zone's DNSKEY RRset
> >        must have a corresponding ZSK signature for each record
> >        in the zone.
> 
> You are missing:
> 
> C. Each algorithm for which a DNSKEY exists, must sign all the records
> in the zone.

And the invariant holds, because it is signed with ZSKs for both
algorithms.

> Because of caching, step 1 potentially breaks this invariant.
> 
> https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6781#section-4.1.4 explains this at
> length (with better wording than I used), and appears to get it right.

-- 
    VIktor.


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