Update on stats 2019-02
Viktor Dukhovni
ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Fri Mar 1 08:04:58 CET 2019
Summary: The DANE domain count is now 1,076,237
The number of domains that return DNSSEC-validated replies
in response to MX queries is 9,397,166. Thus DANE TLSA
is deployed on 11.45% of domains with DNSSEC.
Credits: The coverage of DNSSEC domains continues to improve with
ongoing data support from Paul Vixie of Farsight Security.
Credits also due to ICANN for gTLD data via CZDS, and to
the TLD registries for .CH, .COM, .DK, .FR, .INFO, .IS, .LI,
.NL, .NU, .ORG and .SE. More data sources of ccTLD
signed delegations welcome.
As of today I count 1,076,237 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA
records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As
expected, the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the DNS/email
hosting providers who've enabled DANE support for the customer
domains they host. The top 20 MX host providers by domain count
are:
679515 one.com
121564 transip.nl
96967 domeneshop.no
35708 active24.com
32613 vevida.com
24067 udmedia.de
12902 onebit.cz
10954 bhosted.nl
5628 previder.nl
3591 interconnect.nl
2499 provalue.nl
2361 nederhost.nl
1653 nmugroup.com
1460 yourdomainprovider.net
1330 hi7.de
1316 prolocation.net
1285 xcellerate.nl
1261 surfmailfilter.nl
1101 soverin.net
827 mailbox.org
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.cz/.de/.eu/.be.
Speaking of countries, the IPv4 GeoIP distribution of DANE-enabled
MX hosts shows the below top 20 countries (each unique IP address
is counted, so multi-homed MX hosts are perhaps somewhat
over-represented).
4801 TOTAL
1629 DE, Germany
1001 US, United States
658 NL, Netherlands
356 FR, France
188 GB, United Kingdom
161 CZ, Czechia
97 CA, Canada
78 SG, Singapore
68 CH, Switzerland
64 SE, Sweden
47 DK, Denmark
43 IE, Ireland
42 BR, Brazil
38 AT, Austria
36 AU, Australia
30 FI, Finland
26 PL, Poland
26 JP, Japan
24 RU, Russia
18 NO, Norway
IPv6 is still comparatively rare for MX hosts, and the top 20
countries by DANE MX host IPv6 GeoIP are:
1834 TOTAL
664 DE, Germany
320 NL, Netherlands
207 FR, France
162 US, United States
117 CZ, Czechia
82 GB, United Kingdom
35 SE, Sweden
32 RU, Russia
30 CH, Switzerland
23 CA, Canada
20 AT, Austria
13 IE, Ireland
12 DK, Denmark
11 NO, Norway
11 AU, Australia
9 SI, Slovenia
9 FI, Finland
8 UA, Ukraine
6 IT, Italy
5 SK, Slovakia
There are 4032 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 5941. These
cover 6373 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA
records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 225 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 113 are in recent (last 90 days of) reports:
univie.ac.at posteo.de ouderportaal.nl
gmx.at ruhr-uni-bochum.de overheid.nl
nic.br tu-darmstadt.de pathe.nl
registro.br tum.de photofacts.nl
gmx.ch uni-erlangen.de photofactsacademy.nl
open.ch unitybox.de politie.nl
anubisnetworks.com unitymedia.de rijksoverheid.nl
fmc-na.com web.de ssonet.nl
gmx.com dk-hostmaster.dk transip.nl
habr.com egmontpublishing.dk truetickets.nl
hotelsinduitsland.com netic.dk utwente.nl
kpn.com tilburguniversity.edu uvt.nl
mail.com dovecot.fi xs4all.nl
one.com insee.fr domeneshop.no
solvinity.com octopuce.fr handelsbanken.no
t-2.com web200.hu webcruitermail.no
telfort.com comcast.net atelkamera.nu
trashmail.com dd24.net aegee.org
xfinity.com gmx.net debian.org
xfinityhomesecurity.com habramail.net freebsd.org
xfinitymobile.com hr-manager.net gentoo.org
active24.cz inexio.net ietf.org
cuni.cz mpssec.net isc.org
itesco.cz procurios.net mailbox.org
klubpevnehozdravi.cz riseup.net netbsd.org
onebit.cz t-2.net openssl.org
smtp.cz transip.net ozlabs.org
virusfree.cz vevida.net samba.org
allsecur.de xs4all.net torproject.org
bayern.de ardanta.nl asf.com.pt
bund.de atletiekunie.nl handelsbanken.se
elster.de bhosted.nl iis.se
fau.de boozyshop.nl minmyndighetspost.se
freenet.de hierinloggen.nl personligalmanacka.se
gmx.de interconnect.nl skatteverket.se
jpberlin.de intermax.nl t-2.si
lrz.de mailplus.nl govtrack.us
mail.de minbzk.nl
Of the DANE email domains, 2014 are listed in the Alexa top 1 million
(web site) list.
Of the ~1.08 million domains, 2324 have "partial" TLSA records,
that cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects
traffic to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable
to the usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 259. Some of these have additional MX hosts that don't
have broken TLSA records, so mail can still arrive via the remaining
MX hosts. A partial list is available at:
https://github.com/danefail/list
To avoid getting listed, please make sure to monitor the validity
of your own TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation
procedure. See:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes
https://github.com/baknu/DANE-for-SMTP/wiki/2.-Implementation-resources
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email, the
number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support stands at
525. The top 10 name server operators with problem domains are:
35 dotserv.com
34 tiscomhosting.nl
31 schefczyk.net
31 nrdns.nl
30 sylconia.net
25 metaregistrar.nl
24 active24.cz (customer zones with broken wildcard cnames)
21 nazwa.pl (customer zones with broken wildcard NS RRs)
19 movenext.nl
12 is.nl
If anyone has good contacts at some of these providers, please
encourage them to remediate not only the broken domains (I can send
them a list), but also the root cause that makes the breakage
possible.
Seven of the domains all whose nameservers have broken denial of
existence appear in historical Google reports:
trt01.gov.br
trtrio.gov.br
trt1.jus.br
trtrj.jus.br
accenturealumni.com
rackeo.host
sauditelecom.com.sa
--
Viktor.
[1] Some domains deliberately include MX hosts that are always
down, presumably as a hurdle to botnet SMTP code that gives up
where real MTAs might persist. I am not a fan of this type of
defence (it can also impose undue latency on legitimate email).
However, provided the dead hosts still have TLSA records, (which
don't need to match anything, just need to exist and be well-formed)
there's no loss of security.
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