Update on stats 2018-09
Viktor Dukhovni
ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Sun Sep 30 20:39:04 CEST 2018
Credits: The coverage of DNSSEC domains continues to improve with
ongoing data support from Paul Vixie of Farsight Security.
Credits also due to ICANN for gTLD data via CZDS, and to
the TLD registries for .CH, .COM, .DK, .FR, .INFO, .LI,
.NAME, .NL, .NU, .ORG and .SE. More data sources of ccTLD
signed delegations welcome.
Summary: The DANE domain count is now 316,920
The number DNSSEC domains in the survey stands at 8,986,410.
Thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 3.52% of domains with DNSSEC.
This month DNSSEC denial of existence issues were resolved
at KPN Internedservices (internedservices.nl or is.nl)
and dotroll.com (also known as webspacecontrol.com). My
thanks to both for taking action to significantly reduce
the residual barriers to DANE adoption.
As of today I count 316,920 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA
records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As
expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the DNS/email
hosting providers who've enabled DANE support for the customer
domains they host. The top 15 MX host providers by domain count are:
114384 transip.nl
96340 domeneshop.no
34676 active24.com
23670 udmedia.de
10761 bhosted.nl
3721 interconnect.nl
2533 provalue.nl
2451 nederhost.nl
1521 yourdomainprovider.net
1299 xcellerate.nl
1189 hi7.de
1062 surfmailfilter.nl
753 omc-mail.com
622 core-networks.de
591 mailbox.org
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.cz/.de/.eu/.be.
Speaking of countries, the IPv4 GeoIP distribution of DANE-enabled
MX hosts shows the below top 10 countries (each unique IP address
is counted, so multi-homed MX hosts are perhaps somewhat
over-represented):
4251 TOTAL
1449 DE, Germany
910 US, United States
549 NL, Netherlands
330 FR, France
158 GB, United Kingdom
128 CZ, Czech Republic
110 CA, Canada
57 SE, Sweden
56 SG, Singapore
55 CH, Switzerland
IPv6 is still comparatively rare for MX hosts, and the top 10
countries by DANE MX host IPv6 GeoIP are (same top 6).
2126 TOTAL
816 DE, Germany
426 US, United States
317 NL, Netherlands
191 FR, France
70 GB, United Kingdom
70 CZ, Czech Republic
37 SE, Sweden
27 SG, Singapore
19 CH, Switzerland
17 AT, Austria
There are 3571 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 5087. These
cover 5449 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA
records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 168 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 86 are in recent (last 90 days of) reports:
gmx.at lrz.de ouderportaal.nl
transip.be mail.de overheid.nl
nic.br posteo.de pathe.nl
registro.br ruhr-uni-bochum.de politie.nl
gmx.ch tum.de transip.nl
open.ch uni-erlangen.de truetickets.nl
anubisnetworks.com unitybox.de uvt.nl
gmx.com unitymedia.de xs4all.nl
mail.com web.de domeneshop.no
societe.com dk-hostmaster.dk handelsbanken.no
solvinity.com egmontpublishing.dk rushtrondheim.no
t-2.com netic.dk webcruitermail.no
trashmail.com tilburguniversity.edu aegee.org
xfinity.com insee.fr debian.org
xfinityhomesecurity.com octopuce.fr freebsd.org
xfinitymobile.com comcast.net gentoo.org
active24.cz gmx.net ietf.org
cuni.cz hr-manager.net isc.org
destroystores.cz inexio.net netbsd.org
klubpevnehozdravi.cz mpssec.net openssl.org
optimail.cz t-2.net samba.org
smtp.cz transip.net torproject.org
bayern.de xs4all.net asf.com.pt
bund.de bhosted.nl handelsbanken.se
elster.de boozyshop.nl minmyndighetspost.se
fau.de deltion.nl skatteverket.se
freenet.de hierinloggen.nl t-2.si
gmx.de interconnect.nl govtrack.us
jpberlin.de intermax.nl
Of the ~317000 domains, 1390 have "partial" TLSA records, that
cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic
to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the
usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 258. Some of these have additional MX hosts that don't
have broken TLSA records, so mail can still arrive via the remaining
MX hosts. A partial list is available at:
https://github.com/danefail/list
To avoid getting listed, please make sure to monitor the validity
of your own TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation
procedure. See:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes
http://imrryr.org/~viktor/ICANN61-viktor.pdf
http://imrryr.org/~viktor/icann61-viktor.mp3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
The DNSSEC denial of existence breakage is lower this month, as a
result of a complete resolution of all issues at is.nl and dotroll.com.
After eliminating parked domains that do not accept email, the
number of "real" email domains with bad DNSSEC support stands at
531. The top 20 name server operators with problem domains are:
51 dotserv.com
39 tiscomhosting.nl
35 metaregistrar.nl
33 sylconia.net
31 nrdns.nl
25 active24.cz (some broken wildcard cnames)
20 host-redirect.com
19 nazwa.pl (some broken wildcard NS RRs)
12 psb1.org
11 blauwblaatje.nl
10 eth-services.de
10 army.mil
9 vultr.com
9 dnscluster.nl
8 pcextreme.nl
8 forpsi.net
7 ovh.net
6 loopia.se
6 domdom.hu
5 1cocomo.com
If anyone has good contacts at some of these providers, please
encourage them to remediate not only the broken domains (I can send
them a list), but also the root cause that makes the breakage
possible.
None of the domains all whose nameservers have broken denial of
existence appear in historical Google reports. So it is likely
that the DNSSEC denial of existence problems are not felt by most
email senders.
--
Viktor.
[1] Some domains deliberately include MX hosts that are always
down, presumably as a hurdle to botnet SMTP code that gives up
where real MTAs might persist. I am not a fan of this type of
defence (it can also impose undue latency on legitimate email).
However, provided the dead hosts still have TLSA records, (which
don't need to match anything, just need to exist and be well-formed)
there's no loss of security.
More information about the dane-users
mailing list