Update on stats 2018-08
Viktor Dukhovni
ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Sat Sep 1 04:52:41 CEST 2018
Credits: The coverage of DNSSEC domains continues to improve with
ongoing data support from Paul Vixie of Farsight Security.
Credits also due to ICANN for the gTLD data via CZDS,
Afilias for access to .INFO zone data, data contributions
from the TLD registries for .CH, .DK, .INFO, .LI, .NL and
.ORG and open access for .FR, .NU and .SE. More data
sources of ccTLD signed delegations welcome.
Summary: The DANE domain count is now 314,472
The number DNSSEC domains in the survey stands at 8,908,099.
Thus DANE TLSA is deployed on 3.52% of domains with DNSSEC.
All DNSSEC denial of existence issues are resolved at
mijnhostingparner.nl and tse.jus.br.
As of today I count 314,472 domains with correct SMTP DANE TLSA
records at every primary MX host that accepts connections[1]. As
expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted by the DNS/email
hosting providers who've enabled DANE support for the customer
domains they host. The top 15 MX host providers by domain count are:
112848 transip.nl
96132 domeneshop.no
34452 active24.com
23638 udmedia.de
10651 bhosted.nl
3720 interconnect.nl
2491 provalue.nl
2456 nederhost.nl
1666 yourdomainprovider.net
1297 xcellerate.nl
1177 hi7.de
1093 surfmailfilter.nl
724 omc-mail.com
608 core-networks.de
567 mailbox.org
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.cz/.de/.eu/.be.
Speaking of countries, the IPv4 GeoIP distribution of DANE-enabled
MX hosts shows the below top 10 countries (each unique IP address
is counted, so multi-homed MX hosts are perhaps somewhat
over-represented):
4263 TOTAL
1453 DE, Germany
922 US, United States
541 NL, Netherlands
346 FR, France
161 GB, United Kingdom
124 CZ, Czech Republic
100 CA, Canada
58 SE, Sweden
57 SG, Singapore
56 CH, Switzerland
IPv6 is still comparatively rare for MX hosts, and the top 10
countries by DANE MX host IPv6 GeoIP are (same top 6).
2066 TOTAL
813 DE, Germany
435 US, United States
309 NL, Netherlands
194 FR, France
66 GB, United Kingdom
66 CZ, Czech Republic
37 SE, Sweden
28 SG, Singapore
21 CH, Switzerland
18 AT, Austria
There are 3563 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed.
The number of published MX host TLSA RRsets found is 5015. These
cover 5376 distinct MX hosts (some MX hosts share the same TLSA
records through CNAMEs).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 165 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 91 are in recent reports:
gmx.at jpberlin.de ouderportaal.nl
transip.be lrz.de overheid.nl
nic.br mail.de pathe.nl
registro.br posteo.de politie.nl
gmx.ch ruhr-uni-bochum.de transip.nl
open.ch tum.de truetickets.nl
anubisnetworks.com uni-erlangen.de utwente.nl
fmc-na.com unitybox.de uvt.nl
gmx.com unitymedia.de xs4all.nl
mail.com web.de domeneshop.no
societe.com dk-hostmaster.dk rushtrondheim.no
solvinity.com egmontpublishing.dk webcruitermail.no
t-2.com netic.dk aegee.org
trashmail.com tilburguniversity.edu debian.org
xfinity.com insee.fr freebsd.org
xfinityhomesecurity.com octopuce.fr gentoo.org
xfinitymobile.com comcast.net ietf.org
active24.cz dd24.net isc.org
cuni.cz gmx.net netbsd.org
destroystores.cz hr-manager.net openssl.org
klubpevnehozdravi.cz inexio.net samba.org
knizni-magazin.cz mpssec.net torproject.org
nic.cz t-2.net asf.com.pt
optimail.cz transip.net handelsbanken.se
smtp.cz xs4all.net iis.se
bayern.de bhosted.nl minmyndighetspost.se
bund.de boozyshop.nl skatteverket.se
elster.de deltion.nl t-2.si
fau.de hierinloggen.nl govtrack.us
freenet.de interconnect.nl
gmx.de intermax.nl
Of the ~314000 domains, 1193 have "partial" TLSA records, that
cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic
to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the
usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 287. Some of these have additional MX hosts that don't
have broken TLSA records, so mail can still arrive via the remaining
MX hosts. A partial list is available at:
https://github.com/danefail/list
To avoid getting listed, please make sure to monitor the validity
of your own TLSA records, and implement a reliable key rotation
procedure. See:
https://dane.sys4.de/common_mistakes
http://imrryr.org/~viktor/ICANN61-viktor.pdf
http://imrryr.org/~viktor/icann61-viktor.mp3
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.1
http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-8.4
The DNSSEC denial of existence breakage is lower this month, as a
result of a complete resolution of all issues at mijnhostingpartner.nl
and tse.jus.br. After eliminating parked domains that do not accept
email of any kind, the number of "real" email domains with bad
DNSSEC support stands at 708. The top 20 name server operators
with problem domains are:
112 webspacecontrol.com (reportedly working on a solution)
64 is.nl
51 dotserv.com
39 tiscomhosting.nl
33 sylconia.net
33 metaregistrar.nl
29 nrdns.nl
25 active24.cz (some broken wildcard cnames)
21 host-redirect.com
15 nazwa.pl (some broken wildcard NS RRs)
13 psb1.org
12 ultratek.com
11 blauwblaatje.nl
11 army.mil
9 dnscluster.nl
8 vultr.com
8 pcextreme.nl
8 glbns.com
7 forpsi.net
6 domdom.hu
If anyone has good contacts at one of these providers, please
encourage them to remediate not only the broken domains (I can send
them a list), but also the root cause that makes the breakage
possible.
None of the domains all whose nameservers have broken denial of
existence appear in historical Google reports.
--
Viktor.
[1] Some domains deliberately include MX hosts that are always
down, presumably as a hurdle to botnet SMTP code that gives up
where real MTAs might persist. I am not a fan of this type of
defence (it can also impose undue latency on legitimate email).
However, provided the dead hosts still have TLSA records, (which
don't need to match anything, just need to exist and be well-formed)
there's no loss of security.
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