From ietf-dane at dukhovni.org Sat Jan 28 06:57:55 2017 From: ietf-dane at dukhovni.org (Viktor Dukhovni) Date: Sat, 28 Jan 2017 05:57:55 +0000 Subject: Update on stats (no major changes) Message-ID: <20170128055755.GF27197@mournblade.imrryr.org> [ The main notable change is that forpsi.cz have fixed the corner-case issues in their DNS and no longer generate occasional "bogus" denial of existence of TLSA records. ] As of today I count 106082 domains with correct DANE TLSA records for SMTP. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by domain count are: 42447 domeneshop.no 34169 transip.nl 15176 udmedia.de 1737 bhosted.nl 1287 nederhost.net 892 ec-elements.com 390 core-networks.de 299 uvt.nl 261 bit.nl 256 omc-mail.com The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to the full zone data for any ccTLDs, and in particular .de and .nl. There are 2332 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are found, this counts each of the above registrars as just one zone, so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers deployed. Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count (2421) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the same ~106000 domains. Of the ~106000 domains, 609 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual active attacks via the remaining MX hosts. The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands today at 63 (~3 are recent additions that will likely be resolved soon, the remaining ~60 are the for now stable population of broken domains). The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 388. The top 10 DNS providers (by broken domain count) are: 56 axc.nl - Slated to be resolved 37 infracom.nl 19 loopia.se 19 active24.cz 14 jsr-it.nl 12 cas-com.net 10 ignum.com 8 ovh.net 7 tse.jus.br 7 is.nl Around 100 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver, and so are email-reachable, given enough retries. The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's transparency report is 96 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of these 46 are in recent reports (January 2017): bayern.de ietf.org ruhr-uni-bochum.de bund.de insee.fr samba.org comcast.net ish.de t-2.net dd24.net jpberlin.de torproject.org debian.org kabelmail.de tum.de domeneshop.no lrz.de uni-erlangen.de enron.email mail.com unitybox.de fau.de mail.de unitymedia.de freebsd.org netbsd.org web.de gentoo.org octopuce.fr webcruitermail.no gmx.at open.ch xfinity.com gmx.ch openssl.org xs4all.net gmx.com ouderportaal.nl xs4all.nl gmx.de overheid.nl xworks.net gmx.net posteo.de hr-manager.net registro.br A recent addition that is not listed above is "exim.org". It seems that "exim.org" mailing lists don't process enough email to land on Google transparency reports. I don't have any way to measure how many domains enable DANE outbound but aren't using DNSSEC for their own domain or are not publishing TLSA records. It is easy to do, just fire up a local validating resolver, adjust /etc/resolv.conf to list only 127.0.0.1 and/or ::1, and add a couple of lines to main.cf. So the stats I am reporting reflects only DANE adoption for inbound email. -- Viktor.