Update on stats 2017-07 (infracom.nl DNS resolved)

Viktor Dukhovni ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Tue Aug 1 01:30:08 CEST 2017

Summary:  Mostly the same as last month, with significant progress
          on the DNS front, as infracom.nl's nameservers now handle
	  TLSA lookups correctly (they now respond with valid denial
	  of existence or actual TLSA records as appropriate).

	  The number of DANE-enabled domains that have also been
	  sighted on Google's email transparency report has increased
	  from 111 to 114, while the number of DNS zones with
	  TLSA-enabled MX hosts has increased from 2615 to 2668.
	  The overall count has increased from 171460 to 171738.


    This month I've begun the transition to new backend code for
    the survey.  The main visible change is that MX hosts that are,
    despite RFC requirements, CNAMEs for the real underlying host
    are no longer excluded from the survey.  This leads to a small
    bump in the reported domain count (+81) that is due to the code


    The survey only includes domains at least of whose "primary"
    MX hosts has secure TLSA records.  The previous survey code
    skipped past any MX hosts that provably (DNSSEC-validated) had
    neither IPv4 nor IPv6 addresses (secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA).
    The new survey code makes this more difficult, and I may at
    some point stop including these domains (613 at last count).

As of today I count 171738 domains with correct DANE TLSA records
for SMTP.  As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the
handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in
bulk for the domains they host.  The top 10 MX host providers by
domain count are:

  69168 domeneshop.no
  60171 transip.nl
  18330 udmedia.de
   6611 bhosted.nl
   1809 nederhost.net
   1341 yourdomainprovider.net -- (includes former networking4all.net domains)
   1002 ec-elements.com
    512 core-networks.de
    378 omc-mail.com
    342 bit.nl

The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.

There are 2668 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed.  Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count
(2910) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the
same ~171000 domains (this month the count includes all the MX
hosts, rather just a single primary MX).

A related number is 3797 matching TLSA RRsets found for MX host
TCP port 25.  These certificates are vended by 3951 distinct MX
hosts (some of which clearly employ a shared certificate).

The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 114 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain).  Of
these, 56 are in recent reports:

  gmx.at                   lrz.de                   otvi.nl
  nic.br                   mail.de                  ouderportaal.nl
  registro.br              posteo.de                overheid.nl
  gmx.ch                   ruhr-uni-bochum.de       pathe.nl
  open.ch                  tum.de                   uvt.nl
  anubisnetworks.com       uni-erlangen.de          xs4all.nl
  gmx.com                  unitymedia.de            domeneshop.no
  mail.com                 web.de                   webcruitermail.no
  solvinity.com            tilburguniversity.edu    debian.org
  trashmail.com            enron.email              freebsd.org
  xfinity.com              octopuce.fr              gentoo.org
  xfinityhomesecurity.com  comcast.net              ietf.org
  bayern.de                dd24.net                 isc.org
  bund.de                  gmx.net                  netbsd.org
  elster.de                hr-manager.net           openssl.org
  fau.de                   mpssec.net               samba.org
  freenet.de               t-2.net                  torproject.org
  gmx.de                   xs4all.net               asf.com.pt
  jpberlin.de              asp4all.nl

Of the ~172000 domains, 888 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts.  While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.

The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 101.  Below is a list of the 55 underlying MX hosts that
serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality:

  Hall of Shame:

  mail.dipietro.id.au        h-hibernia.olnis-net.de    dorothy.goldenhairdafo.net
  eumembers.stansoft.bg      mx1.spamsponge.de          mail.iaelu.net
  mx.delphij.com             mail.stmartin-schwabach.de hs.kuzenkov.net
  mail.digitalwebpros.com    mx.thorko.de               oostergo.net
  demo.liveconfig.com        smtp.flipmail.es           cinnamon.nl
  intranet.nctechcenter.com  mail.0pc.eu                mail.e-rave.nl
  ny-do.pieterpottie.com     palinet.eu                 mail.jekuiken.nl
  diablo.sgt.com             mx.quentindavid.fr         mail.myzt.nl
  tusk.sgt.com               servmail.fr                bounder.steelyard.nl
  mx1.wittsend.com           mail.nonoserver.info       mail.abanto-zierbena.org
  mx.bels.cz                 mail.bax.is                beerstra.org
  gaia.nfx.cz                mail.laukas.lt             eumembers.datacentrix.org
  mail.b0red.de              mx.datenknoten.me          smtp3.amadigi.ovh
  mail.bg-netzwerk.de        mx.giesen.me               mail.pasion.ro
  mail.denniseffing.de       completelyunoriginal.moe   puggan.se
  mutt.lsexperts.de          mail.castleturing.net      mail.rostit.se
  mail.manima.de             horse.cherrypet.net        protector.rajmax.si
  www.mtg.de                 anubis.delphij.net
  h-hibernia.olnis-Net.de    goldenhairdafo.net

The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 374.  The top 10
DNS providers with problem domains are:

  66 jsr-it.nl
  26 active24.cz
  25 tiscomhosting.nl
  19 firstfind.nl
  16 rdw.nl
   9 metaregistrar.nl
   9 ignum.com
   8 ovh.net
   8 loopia.se
   7 rootdomains.nl

Around 46 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver,
and so are email-reachable, given enough retries.  Only 5 of the
DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email transparency


The associated DNS lookup issues are:

  _25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br/dnssec/
  _25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br/dnssec/
  _25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br/dnssec/
  _25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
  _25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
  _25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br/dnssec/

  [ See <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08>,
    Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a
    "feature" of Arbor Networks firewalls, that enables droping of
    DNS requests for all but the most common RRtypes.  Do not make
    the mistake of enabling this firewall "feature". ]

The oldest outstanding DNS issue is another SOA signature issue
at truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:


I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about
and take the time to resolve the problem.


More information about the dane-users mailing list