Update on stats 2017-07 (infracom.nl DNS resolved)
Viktor Dukhovni
ietf-dane at dukhovni.org
Tue Aug 1 01:30:08 CEST 2017
Summary: Mostly the same as last month, with significant progress
on the DNS front, as infracom.nl's nameservers now handle
TLSA lookups correctly (they now respond with valid denial
of existence or actual TLSA records as appropriate).
The number of DANE-enabled domains that have also been
sighted on Google's email transparency report has increased
from 111 to 114, while the number of DNS zones with
TLSA-enabled MX hosts has increased from 2615 to 2668.
The overall count has increased from 171460 to 171738.
NOTE 1:
This month I've begun the transition to new backend code for
the survey. The main visible change is that MX hosts that are,
despite RFC requirements, CNAMEs for the real underlying host
are no longer excluded from the survey. This leads to a small
bump in the reported domain count (+81) that is due to the code
change.
NOTE 2:
The survey only includes domains at least of whose "primary"
MX hosts has secure TLSA records. The previous survey code
skipped past any MX hosts that provably (DNSSEC-validated) had
neither IPv4 nor IPv6 addresses (secure NXDOMAIN or NODATA).
The new survey code makes this more difficult, and I may at
some point stop including these domains (613 at last count).
As of today I count 171738 domains with correct DANE TLSA records
for SMTP. As expected the bulk of the DANE domains are hosted the
handful of DNS/hosting providers who've enabled DANE support in
bulk for the domains they host. The top 10 MX host providers by
domain count are:
69168 domeneshop.no
60171 transip.nl
18330 udmedia.de
6611 bhosted.nl
1809 nederhost.net
1341 yourdomainprovider.net -- (includes former networking4all.net domains)
1002 ec-elements.com
512 core-networks.de
378 omc-mail.com
342 bit.nl
The real numbers are surely larger, because I don't have access to
the full zone data for most ccTLDs, especially .no/.nl/.de.
There are 2668 unique zones in which the underlying MX hosts are
found, this counts each of the above providers as just one zone,
so is a measure of the breadth of adoption in terms of servers
deployed. Alternatively, a similar number is seen in the count
(2910) of distinct MX host server certificates that support the
same ~171000 domains (this month the count includes all the MX
hosts, rather just a single primary MX).
A related number is 3797 matching TLSA RRsets found for MX host
TCP port 25. These certificates are vended by 3951 distinct MX
hosts (some of which clearly employ a shared certificate).
The number of domains that at some point were listed in Gmail's
email transparency report is 114 (this is my ad-hoc criterion for
a domain being a large-enough actively used email domain). Of
these, 56 are in recent reports:
gmx.at lrz.de otvi.nl
nic.br mail.de ouderportaal.nl
registro.br posteo.de overheid.nl
gmx.ch ruhr-uni-bochum.de pathe.nl
open.ch tum.de uvt.nl
anubisnetworks.com uni-erlangen.de xs4all.nl
gmx.com unitymedia.de domeneshop.no
mail.com web.de webcruitermail.no
solvinity.com tilburguniversity.edu debian.org
trashmail.com enron.email freebsd.org
xfinity.com octopuce.fr gentoo.org
xfinityhomesecurity.com comcast.net ietf.org
bayern.de dd24.net isc.org
bund.de gmx.net netbsd.org
elster.de hr-manager.net openssl.org
fau.de mpssec.net samba.org
freenet.de t-2.net torproject.org
gmx.de xs4all.net asf.com.pt
jpberlin.de asp4all.nl
Of the ~172000 domains, 888 have "partial" TLSA records, that cover
only a subset of the MX hosts. While this protects traffic to some
of the MX hosts, such domains are still vulnerable to the usual
active attacks via the remaining MX hosts.
The number of domains with incorrect TLSA records or failure to
advertise STARTTLS (even though TLSA records are published) stands
today at 101. Below is a list of the 55 underlying MX hosts that
serve these domains and whose TLSA records don't match reality:
Hall of Shame:
mail.dipietro.id.au h-hibernia.olnis-net.de dorothy.goldenhairdafo.net
eumembers.stansoft.bg mx1.spamsponge.de mail.iaelu.net
mx.delphij.com mail.stmartin-schwabach.de hs.kuzenkov.net
mail.digitalwebpros.com mx.thorko.de oostergo.net
demo.liveconfig.com smtp.flipmail.es cinnamon.nl
intranet.nctechcenter.com mail.0pc.eu mail.e-rave.nl
ny-do.pieterpottie.com palinet.eu mail.jekuiken.nl
diablo.sgt.com mx.quentindavid.fr mail.myzt.nl
tusk.sgt.com servmail.fr bounder.steelyard.nl
mx1.wittsend.com mail.nonoserver.info mail.abanto-zierbena.org
mx.bels.cz mail.bax.is beerstra.org
gaia.nfx.cz mail.laukas.lt eumembers.datacentrix.org
mail.b0red.de mx.datenknoten.me smtp3.amadigi.ovh
mail.bg-netzwerk.de mx.giesen.me mail.pasion.ro
mail.denniseffing.de completelyunoriginal.moe puggan.se
mutt.lsexperts.de mail.castleturing.net mail.rostit.se
mail.manima.de horse.cherrypet.net protector.rajmax.si
www.mtg.de anubis.delphij.net
h-hibernia.olnis-Net.de goldenhairdafo.net
The number of domains with bad DNSSEC support is 374. The top 10
DNS providers with problem domains are:
66 jsr-it.nl
26 active24.cz
25 tiscomhosting.nl
19 firstfind.nl
16 rdw.nl
9 metaregistrar.nl
9 ignum.com
8 ovh.net
8 loopia.se
7 rootdomains.nl
Around 46 of the broken domains have at least one working nameserver,
and so are email-reachable, given enough retries. Only 5 of the
DNS-broken domains appear in historical Google Email transparency
reports:
tiviths.com.br
tre-sp.jus.br
trt1.jus.br
trtrj.jus.br
tse.jus.br
The associated DNS lookup issues are:
_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx.tiviths.com.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trt1.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; zone signature failure: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mx1.trtrj.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.dexter.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.lalavava.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br. IN TLSA ? ; TLSA non-response: http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.mandark.tse.jus.br/dnssec/
[ See <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-no-response-issue-08>,
Much of the TLSA non-response issue seems to be related to a
"feature" of Arbor Networks firewalls, that enables droping of
DNS requests for all but the most common RRtypes. Do not make
the mistake of enabling this firewall "feature". ]
The oldest outstanding DNS issue is another SOA signature issue
at truman.edu dating back to Nov/2014:
http://dnsviz.net/d/_25._tcp.barracuda.truman.edu/VGzORw/dnssec/
I hope some day soon they'll start missing email they care about
and take the time to resolve the problem.
--
Viktor.
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